Utah v. Mitchell Worwood : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
Utah v. Mitchell Worwood : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros; Assistant Attorney General; Appeals Division; Attorney for Appellee.
Scott P. Card; Jennifer K. Gowans; Fillmore Spencer LLC; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Worwood, No. 20040701 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5169
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MITCHELL WORWOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040701-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE DONALD EYRE PRESIDING. 
J. FREDERICK VOROS (3340) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for State of Utah 
SCOTT P. CARD (6847) 
JENNIFER K. GO WANS (7538) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorneys for Mitchell Worwood 
PUBLISHED OPINION AND ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED F ! L E D , .„ ,
 i n _ . 
UTAHAPPE'- " -HURTS 
JUN 16 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MITCHELL WORWOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040701-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE DONALD EYRE PRESIDING. 
J. FREDERICK VOROS (3340) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
SCOTT P. CARD (6847) 
JENNIFER K. GO WANS (7538) 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
3301 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Attorney for State of Utah Attorneys for Mitchell Worwood 
PUBLISHED OPINION AND ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. THE DETENTION IN THIS CASE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 2 
II. THE DETENTION IN THIS CASE EXCEEDED A LEVEL TWO 
STOP AS MR. WORWOOD WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT 
PROBABLE CAUSE 5 
III. OFFICER WRIGHT DID NOT PURSUE A MEANS OF 
INVESTIGATION LIKELY TO CONFIRM OR DISPEL HIS 
SUSPICIONS QUICKLY 7 
IV. THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE 
UNLAWFUL ARREST IN THIS CASE MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
AS "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE" 10 
CONCLUSION 12 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Federal Cases 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) 6 
Florida Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) . 8 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) 2 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) 10 
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) 8 
United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 203 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2000) 11 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) 5 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) 8 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 10, 11 
State Cases 
Beckv. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979) 3 
Elton v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 30 Utah 2d 213 (Utah 1973) 3 
Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), 
aff d, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994) 3 
State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1992) 6-7 
ii 
State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992) 3 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 5 
State v Rodriguez-LopL 954 P.2d 1290 (Utah App. 1998) 3 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987) 6 
United States Constitution 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Fourth Amendment 2, 7, 9 
Utah Code Annotated 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-1 6, 7 
in 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MITCHELL WORWOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040701-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cory Wright lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Worwood in this case as 
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, a wet spot and a partially crushed beer can laying on a 
road do not constitute reasonable articulable facts that a crime has been or is about to be 
committed. There are many reasons unrelated to criminal conduct why a person might 
have bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Further, there were no objective facts to suggest 
that Mr. Worwood was impaired, such as the smell of alcohol, body sway or an impaired 
driving pattern. Therefore, based on the totality of these circumstances, Officer Wright 
lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Worwood. 
Even assuming arguendo that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the level 
two stop, Mr. Worwood was then unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The facts 
of this case constitute an arrest under both federal and state law. Because there was no 
probable cause to arrest, the level three detention was unlawful and all evidence obtained 
thereby must be suppressed. 
The detention of Mr. Worwood in this case was also unlawful because the 
officer's decision to take Mr. Worwood into custody and transport him to another location 
so as not to "mess up" the officer's night, was not a diligent means of investigation likely 
to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions of impairment quickly. Moreover, it was not 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, as the officer testified that he could have 
conducted field sobriety tests at the scene but he chose not to. 
The evidence in this case, particularly the field sobriety and intoxilizer test 
results, were obtained as a direct result of the unlawful arrest. Therefore, that evidence so 
obtained should be suppressed as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DETENTION IN THIS CASE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION. 
It is undisputed in this case that Mr. Worwood was not free to leave once Cory 
Wright noticed his bloodshot eyes and slurred speech (R92:13-15). However, Cory 
Wright lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Worwood. "While reasonable suspicion 
is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably 
less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a 
minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119 (2000). An officer's reasonable suspicion must be based on "unusual conduct" 
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strongly suggestive of criminal activity. State v Rodriguez-LopU 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 
(Utah App. 1998). Finally, whether there are objective facts sufficient to create a 
reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Provo City v Warden, 
844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992), aff d, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). 
As applied here, a wet spot on a road is not evidence of intoxication. It also 
cannot be concluded from one or even several beer cans that a person possessing them is 
intoxicated. See, State v Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining that 
a car cluttered with beer cans and defendants5 bloodshot eyes did not indicate criminal 
activity). In this case, a partially crushed beer can laying on a public road cannot even 
be tied to Mr. Worwood. Further, it is well settled in Utah that bloodshot eyes are 
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated. Id. ("And 
while bloodshot eyes can indicate the presence of drugs or alcohol, they are equally 
indicative of dust in one's eyes or lack of sleep.5'). It is also not uncommon for slurred 
speech to be a person's normal speech pattern (see, Beck v Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1343 
(Utah 1979), or to be the result of an involuntary medical condition unrelated to 
intoxication (see, Elton v Bankers Life & Casualty Co ,30 Utah 2d 213, 215 (Utah 
1973)). 
Cory testified that he stopped initially because there was a "big wet spot on the 
road and then there was a beer can15 (R92:5). Cory suspected that Mr. Worwood had been 
dumping water out of a cooler because of the size of the wet spot (R92:6).1 Further, and 
contrary to the State's representation of the facts, Cory did not detect any odor of alcohol 
until after he took Mr. Worwood into custody and placed him into Cory's truck. As Cory 
testified, it was at that point that he first detected the odor of alcohol and "I know it 
wasn't coming from my vehicle . . ." (R92:9). In short, Cory determined solely from Mr. 
Worwood's speech and the appearance of his eyes either that Mr. Worwood had been 
drinking "or there was something wrong" (R92:13). By his own testimony, there were no 
other facts that Cory relied upon when he determined Mr. Worwood was not allowed to 
drive and that he would transport Mr. Worwood to Cory's personal residence, where 
another officer would be summoned to perform field sobriety tests (R92:14). There were 
no facts to suggest Mr. Worwood was impaired. 
Although Mr. Worwood entered his vehicle and drove it a short distance to move 
it off the road, Cory Wright noticed no body sway or driving pattern to suggest Mr. 
Worwood was intoxicated, nor did Cory detect the odor of alcohol until after he took Mr. 
Worwood into custody (R92:9). Cory decided to detain Mi*. Worwood for further 
investigation based solely upon his purported slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a wet spot 
on the road, and a partially crushed beer can laying nearby on the road (R92:12, 13). 
lBoth the trial court and the State incorrectly assume there was an empty cooler. 
There is nothing in the record to support this assumption. Although Mr. Worwood's 
vehicle was never inventoried, Cory testified that he later found a cooler filled with ice 
and some alcohol (R92:6, 13). 
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Further, Cory determined that Mr. Worwood had been drinking solely from his speech 
and the appearance of his eyes (R92:13). 
Based on the totality of these circumstances and the law cited above, these facts 
are insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion and to justify the detaining of Mr. 
Worwood in this case. 
I I THE DETENTION IN THIS CASE EXCEEDED A LEVEL TWO 
STOP AS MR. WORWOOD WAS ARRESTED WITHOUT 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Mr. Worwood was arrested without 
probable cause, and therefore, whether all evidence seized as a result of that unlawful 
arrest should be suppressed. The State does not directly argue the fact that Cory lacked 
probable cause to arrest Mr. Worwood when he was placed in Cory's vehicle.2 The State 
merely argues that this was a level two encounter and an appropriate investigative 
detention rather than an arrest. The State is wrong, as the law herein will demonstrate. 
The test as to whether a seizure occurs is objective. A seizure occurs if "in view 
of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave." United State's v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 
(1980); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). The objective of the inquiry is 
2The State does suggest in a footnote that there might have been probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Worwood on the basis of slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and the odor of 
alcohol. However, as noted herein, Mr. Worwood was taken into custody before the 
officer detected any odor of alcohol. Accordingly, the precedent relied upon by the State 
does not apply here. 
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to deduce whether the defendant remained in the spirit of cooperation with the officer's 
investigation or believed that he was not free to go. State v Trnjillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 
(UtahApp. 1987). 
The facts in this case constitute an arrest under federal law. A de facto arrest 
occurs when the events that occur during a detention are indistinguishable from an arrest. 
See, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (explaining that the taking of a 
murder suspect to the police station for investigative purposes, where he confessed after 
one hour of interrogation, was not merely an investigative detention, but was an arrest, as 
these events were indistinguishable from an arrest). This case is similar to those in 
Dunaway, as the officer's refusing to let Mr. Worwood drive, placing him in the officer's 
personal vehicle, and transporting him to the officer's personal residence are 
circumstances indistinguishable from an arrest. 
The facts in this case also constitute an arrest under State law. As previously 
noted in Mr. Worwood's opening brief, "an arrest is an actual restraint of the person 
arrested or submission to custody." UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-1. Under this controlling 
statute, Mr. Worwood was undisputably arrested. He was placed in the officer's personal 
vehicle without resistance - he was both restrained and submitted himself to custody. 
The taking of Mr. Worwood into custody, not allowing him to drive his truck, 
and transporting him to another location, was highly intrusive and clearly constitutes a 
level 3 encounter, or in other words, an arrest, under Utah Code Ann. §77-7-1 and State v. 
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Hansen, 837 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1992).3 Mr. Worwood was told he could not drive 
until another trooper looked at him, and he was not free to leave (R92:13-15). Further. 
the events of this encounter were indistinguishable from an arrest. As this Court 
explained, a level two encounter is brief and nonintrusive, where a level three encounter 
"involves an arrest, which has been characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy 
detention that requires probable cause. A level three encounter is also a Fourth 
Amendment seizure." Id. at 661 (emphasis added). This fact is dispositive to Mr. 
Worwood's appeal, as all evidence seized as a result of the unlawful arrest must be 
suppressed. 
III. OFFICER WRIGHT DID NOT PURSUE A MEANS OF 
INVESTIGATION LIKELY TO CONFIRM OR DISPEL HIS 
SUSPICIONS QUICKLY. 
Contrary to the State's brief, there is nothing in the facts to suggest that the 
scene of the stop in this case was an unsuitable location to perform field sobriety tests. 
Also, notwithstanding the fact that the taking of Mr. Worwood into custody without 
probable cause constituted an unlawful arrest, Cory Wright's actions further exceeded the 
3The State cites multiple cases where courts have held that moving the defendant 
to a separate location did not constitute an arrest. BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") 
at 18-20. There are two obvious problems with the State's use of these cases which the 
State does not address. First, inapposite to the facts here, not one cased cited by the State 
suggests that the transporting of the defendant was done for officer convenience rather 
than necessity. Second, under the plain language of the controlling Utah statutory 
provision, Mr. Worwood was arrested, as he had at least submitted himself to custody. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-7-1. 
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scope of a level two stop because he did not diligently pursue a means of investigation 
likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 
686 (1985) (uwe have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to 
be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes." 
Id at 685 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)).4 
This fact is illuminated by Cory's own testimony that he pursued a means of 
investigation that catered to his personal whims and convenience, and that would not 
require him to make an arrest when he was off-duty and thereby "mess up" his night. 
Therefore, assuming arguendo that the officer involved had a reasonable 
suspicion that Mr. Worwood was impaired and a level two stop was justified, the next 
question is what course of action was then reasonable and likely to confirm or dispel the 
officer's suspicions quickly. This is a question of necessity, not of convenience. Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining that the detention "must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.") (emphasis added). 
In this case, this mandate translates into a conclusion that the officer should have 
taken the 2-3 minutes to perform field sobriety tests at the scene. It was simply not 
necessary to take Mr. Worwood into custody and transport him to a different location to 
perform field sobriety tests, as Cory admitted during his testimony (R92:l 1,14,15). 
4Thus, the central query is not the length of the detention, as the State seems to 
suggest, but the diligence of the officer in pursuing a means of investigation likely to 
confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly. 
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Therefore, what the State is really asking this Court to do here is to expand the 
bases of an investigative detention from what is necessary to what is convenient.3 
Moreover, the State is asking this Court to justify a level three encounter, i.e., an arrest, to 
avoid having an officer's night "messed up" by the inconvenience of performing field 
sobriety tests when he is off duty. 
The State's position effectively supports a holding that a person may be taken 
into custody without probable cause. If an officer is qualified, but is not inclined to 
conduct field sobriety tests for reasons of mere personal convenience as established by the 
record in this case (R92:l 1, 14, 15),6 the State takes the position that the officer's 
convenience takes precedence over the large volume of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
5The State speculates that Cory Wright did not have his side-arm, handcuffs, etc. 
because he was off-duty. Not only is there no evidence to support this speculation, but it 
is directly contrary to Cory's testimony that he chose not to follow through with the 
investigation and possible subsequent arrest because it would have "messed up" his night 
(R92:11). Moreover, an officer is not required to have handcuffs, a sidearm, or his patrol 
vehicle in order to conduct an arrest. 
6Q. - did you perform any field sobriety tests at that point? 
A. No, no. I've got my experience and training - because I was off duty I 
didn't - 1 didn't want to - you know it would have messed up my night so I 
wanted another officer to come and do those because such I did not, so -
j|e sje ^« ^« ^c 
Q. And prior to taking him into cust - or prior to taking him in your truck into 
custody you could have performed field sobriety tests, correct? 
A. Well, yeah, I guess I could but -
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that requires law enforcement to diligently pursue a means of investigation that does not 
exceed the scope of necessity. Therefore, the element of "'reasonableness" may turn on 
officer preference. As demonstrated herein, this is not the law. 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that Mr. Worwood was 
arrested without probable cause, and the officer did not pursue a means of investigation 
necessary and likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions of impairment quickly. 
Accordingly, all evidence seized as a result of that unlawful de facto arrest, including but 
not necessarily limited to field sobriety and intoxilizer test results, should be suppressed. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE 
UNLAWFUL ARREST IN THIS CASE MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
AS "FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE." 
In light of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence directly on point, it seems 
disingenuous for the State to argue that no evidence was obtained via the unlawful arrest 
of Mr. Worwood. See, Br. Appe. at 22. The contrary should be obvious. "Evidence 
obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to 
exclusion. The question to be resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently 
obtained is 'tainted' or is 'fruit5 of a prior illegality is whether the challenged evidence 
was 'come at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.5 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 
804 (1984) (quoting Wong Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). 
In this case, the evidence against Mr. Worwood was obtained as a direct result of 
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the unconstitutional seizure discussed herein. The State cites United States v. Ibarra-
Sanchez, 203 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) as helpful to its position that the test 
results in this case were not obtained via the unlawful seizure of Mr. Worwood. 
However, the facts in Ibarra-Sanchez are distinguishable from this case. 
The issue in Ibarra-Sanchez revolved around the search of a van after its 
occupants were purportedly unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The van was 
legally stopped on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The defendants were then removed 
from the van, handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle, during which contact the police 
detected the odor of marijuana in the van. The defendants sought to have the marijuana 
subsequently found in the van suppressed. 
The court determined the officers had probable cause to search the van irrespec-
tive of the unlawful seizure of its occupants because they smelled marijuana in the van. 
As the court concluded, the officers would have discovered the marijuana pursuant to a 
lawful search whether the defendants were still in the vehicle, standing on the road, or 
handcuffed in police vehicle. Id. In short, the van was lawfully searched because the 
odor of marijuana gave the officers probable cause. However, the result in Ibarra-
Sanchez would have been different had the officers found evidence as a direct result of 
the unlawful arrests, as in this case.7 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 484. 
Tor example, had the officers searched the defendants' persons incident to arrest 
and found contraband, or had contraband been discovered on the defendants' persons 
pursuant to a more thorough search at booking, that evidence would clearly have been 
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The facts in this case are not similar in any way to those in Ibarra-Sanchez. 
Here, the issue is whether the officer exploited the unlawful arrest and thereby obtained 
evidence, i.e. the results of the field sobriety and intoxilizer tests. This evidence was 
directly obtained as a result of Mr. Worwood being taken into custody and transported to 
Cory Wright's home. This scenario is no different from a case where a defendant is 
arrested without probable cause and drugs are found on his person pursuant lo a search 
incident to arrest. Clearly, this evidence is fruit of the prior illegality of the unlawful 
arrest, and as such, it must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Mitchell Worwood, respectfully requests this Court to hold that the 
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and thereby vacate his conviction in 
this case. 
Respectfully submitted this / ^ day of June, 2005. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
Scott B/Card 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
suppressed under the Fourth Amendment as >;fruit of the poisonous tree." Id 
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